RE: 'Akshara' etc. in the BhG

From the Bhakti List Archives

• April 15, 2002


>-----Original Message-----
>From: Martin Gansten [mailto:Martin.Gansten@teol.lu.se]
>Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 8:32 PM
>

>I didn't intend to write any more on this either, but on 
>consideration, a few clarifications may be in place.

Ditto. Actually more questions. But first a simple question to Mani.

***** Mani2 wrote:
While the akshara-upAsaka meditates principally on the jIva having God as its innermost self, the jnAni meditates principally on God having the jIva as His attribute. (The first is brahma-SarIraka-jIvAtma upAsana, the second is svAtma-viSishTa-brahma upAsana). As Martin has pointed out, Sri Ramanuja mentions that the distinction between these two aspirants is only in the initial stage ("mukha-bhedena" -- see Vedanta Saara).
****

If the differences in upAsana is only in initial stages and only nominal (mukha-bhedena), why does the Lord qualify the axara-upAsana as 'klesho adhikataraH'?

>always do this: it is in the nature of a systematic theology. But when
>eisegesis is carried beyond a certain point, so that the 
>general tenor of the reading begins to differ significantly from that of the 
>text itself, I >cannot help feeling that the text is being violated.

I have been told something similar about Shankaracharya's BSB too; that his Adhyasa bhAShya is an unnecessary preface and is against the tenor of the Sutras. But for a starter (Why, even for others) the tenor cannot be decided unless the purport is fixed. Now, the fact that there are commentaries from people of respectable stature itself suggests that the purport cannot be fixed by the prima facie or dictionary meanings; it is clear that prima facie meaning is simply inconsistent. Also, the systems propounded by each Acharya have a bearing on their interpretation.
IMO, an interpretation should be evaluated on more important factors: concurrence with experience, how 'early in the game' would one resort to human limitations/inconceivability of something, the logical strength, whether a line of interpretation agrees/disagrees with some other mainstream text, the method of analysis etc. Since dictionary meanings anyway cannot give the deeper meaning, a statistical standard such as 'who deviates the most or least' is simply pointless(IMO).

**** I wrote:
>>If the former, it is against one's experience that the collective of Jivas is the referrent of 'yayA idam dhAryate jagat'
>>(by that which the world is held); if the latter, it is never the case that an abstract entity *supports* concrete stuff. 
>>Another point, not yet answered, is that if everything is the Lord svabhAva, what's the point in the Lord claiming Himself >>to be superior to everything else in the next verse?

***** You wrote:
>On Ramanuja's view, the world is in fact dependent on the individual self, which in turn is dependent on God; therefore everything >ultimately depends >on God, making Him superior to everything else. One may in >fact turn the >tables and say: if the self and the world are *not* materially >dependent on >God, but eternally and absolutely separate categories, then what is the >point in claiming His superiority?
******
If you notice you have just come on the other side of the table, paritally: 'me' in 7.4 is interpreted by Madhva and his sub-commentators as 'madadhInA'. Ramanuja interprets it as 'madIyA'; Shankara says the same, but interprets 'prakriti' as nature (he gives a quote to this effect). Since you mentioned this quote in your earlier mails as giving Lord's two 'natures', I would assume that to be the tradition. With that, the question remains: If both prakriti and the Jivas form a part of Lord's nature, basically when everything we know and see is covered as a part of His nature (which I presume is not different from Him), what's the point in saying that He is greater than [everything else = nothing in this case]? 

Would you say that since pot is materially *dependent* on clay, clay is *superior* to pot? Ofcourse there is no question of superiority at all since they are the same stuff *essentially*.
Also, regarding "the world is in fact dependent on the individual self": Isn't this plain against facts of experience? Or is that one will realize this after liberation? That is also not agreeable because from what Ramanuja says in his commentary on 2.10, he clearly says that the soul is fundamentally different from matter (which I think all Vedantins accept). How can a [clay's modification] be essentially different from clay itself? It is in these cases that one feels that notoreity in 'ingenious usage of grammer' is much more benign than that in changing the facts of experience.

**** You wrote
>to overflowing of vakyas supporting it; but as I anticipate 
>that you would
>construe 'self' (atman) in every case to refer to paramatman, 
>I will not
>bother to cite any.
****

As you have well anticipated, shrutis and smritis are overflowing with vakyAs supporting meditation of self, only if the word 'Atman' is construed as jIva in every case. To the best of my guess, each Acharya has interpreted it based on different factors, and has not interpreted it in the same way always, though favoring a particular meaning. Instead of correcting your anticipation, I'd like to know how the following shruti vAkyAs are interpreted:

1. The Yajnavalkya's statements in Br.Up: na vA are patyuH kAmAya patiH priyo bhavati...
2. The Katha Upanishad statement: na ayamAtmA pravachanena labhyo.. yamevaishha vR^iNute tena labhyaH tasyaiSha AtmA vivR^iNute tanUM svAM
3. The Mundaka Upanishad definition of Atma: yasmin dyauH pR^ithivI chAntarikshamotaM...tamevaikaM jAnatha AtmAnam anyAvaacho 
vimuJNchatha amR^itasyaiSha setuH.
4. The Mandukya Up. on Atma. Can one's 'Atma' be construed as having 19 heads in both waking and sleeping state? Is one's Atma: eSha sarveshvaraH eSha sarvaGYa eSho.antaryAmi eSha yoniH sarvasya prabhavaapyayau hi bhuutaanaam.h?

In each of the above, it does not make sense to interpret 'AtmA' as 'Jiva'. 
In the first one, where Yajnvalkya is saying that a husband does not become beloved just by the wife's desire, but by Atma's desire. Does it make any sense to construe Atma as the jIva (of wife/husband)? Similarly in the second one. In the third one, note that 'AtmA' is referred as 'amR^itasyaiSha setuH' (the bridge to moksha!). The fourth is self-explanatory.

Also, the very fact there is a separate BrahmasUtra for this: 1.3.1, that too in the samanvaya adhyAya should indicate what the word Atma should mean, primarily and in most of the scriptural statements; that the rUDhyArtha is not possible to render shAstraa's 'gati sAmAnya'.

Btw, I would be thankful if one can give the sanskrit text of SriBhAshya on BS 1.3.1.

Regards,
Krishna


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